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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVIsION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
Larabee v. Governor of the State'
(decided June 2, 2009)
Four New York State judges brought an action against several
State officials including the Governor.2 At issue was the New York
Legislature's alleged inaction in addressing the judges' compensation
packages.3 Specifically, the judges claim that the legislature engaged
880 N.Y.S.2d 256 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009), aff'd, Maron v. Silver, 2010 WL 605279
(N.Y. 2010). This Recent Case was completed in November 2009 and the author correctly
predicted that the February 2010 New York Court of Appeals decision in Maron, which con-
solidated three judicial compensation cases including Larabee, would be decided in favor of
the judges on the basis of a violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine. Id. at *18.
Though the court stopped short of injunctive relief, Judge Pigott opined that the judges' sala-
ries were held "hostage to other legislative objectives" though, now, by "ensuring that judi-
cial salary increase will premised on their merits" the judiciary will not be encroached upon
by the decision-making authority of the Legislature; "[t]herefore, judicial compensation,
when addressed by the Legislature in present and future budget deliberations cannot depend
on unrelated policy initiatives or legislative compensation adjustments." Id. at *15, *16.
This Recent Case argues in favor of an independent commission to review judicial salary
packages, which would report to the legislature. It is important to note that Judge Pigott
pragmatically reaffirmed that the legislature, while it has authority to set judicial compensa-
tion now based on merit alone, is capable of being checked by the Judiciary. Id. at *18.
Chief Judge Lippman issued a statement the same day the case was decided ostensibly to
underscore the case's legal and historical significance and stated that this case represents the
"first decision by a state court of last resort to find a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine based on a legislature's failure to address, on the merits, the issue of judicial com-
pensation." Judge Jonathan Lippman, Chief Judge New York Court of Appeals, Public
Statement Regarding Judicial Compensation Cases (February 23, 2010), available at
http://www.courts. ny.us.gov. Also noteworthy is the fact that Judge Lippman explained the
ramifications of his recusal due to his involvement as a named plaintiff in one of the suits
and, as such, this case was decided by the remaining judges on the Court by invocation of
the Rule of Necessity, which dates back to the fifteenth century and states that "where no
other judge can be found who is impartial with regard to a particular case, then the court as-
signed to the case is compelled to hear it." Id. This doctrine has been used in other judicial
compensation cases by both federal and state courts. Id.
2 Larabee II, N.Y.S.2d at 259. Plaintiffs are two Family Court Judges, one Civil Court
and one Criminal Court judge all of whom are presently sitting at the time of the lawsuit.
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in the practice of "linkage," or tying together the unrelated issue of
judicial salary adjustments with legislature's own compensation, the
effect of which is a disruption in the Judiciary's performance as a dis-
tinct branch of the government.4 The Supreme Court, New York
County, held that the refusal to pass such legislation was a violation
of the Separation of Powers Doctrine and ordered the defendants to
remedy the abuse within ninety days.s The Appellate Division, First
Department, affirmed the trial court's holding, finding that the legis-
lature's acts reduced the Judiciary to less than the "self-functioning"
branch of government it deserves to be and that Legislative Immunity
was unavailable for use as a shield against any Separation of Powers
violations advanced by the plaintiffs.6 This opinion was in direct op-
position to a prior Third Department decision delivered in 2008.'
Judicial compensation has been a fiercely debated issue in
New York over the years, despite the merits of a judicial increase be-
ing an agreed upon issue on both sides of the argument.8 The road to
rectifying the matter seems paved with puzzling details of political
maneuvering.9
The New York State Judiciary last received a pay increase in
1999.10 Since that time, New York's cost of living has steadily in-
creased, devaluing overall compensation for much of the state's
working population, including judges whose salary levels have re-
mained flat." Meanwhile, many young attorneys at top New York
law firms have been rewarded with salaries that exceed those of the
4 Id. at 259.
Larabee v. Governor of the State of New York 1, 860 N.Y.S.2d 886, 878 (2008). Such
activity was to be accomplished by a good faith effort to adjust the compensation levels and
restore them to the equivalent of the 1998-1999 salary level taking current economic factors
into consideration. It is important to note that this directive is an additional measure beyond
the relief sought by the Plaintiffs.
6 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 264, 269. At the same time, the court found that that any
failure by the Legislature to increase salary was not a diminution in salary.
7 Matter of Maron v. Silver, 871 N.Y.S.2d 404, 419 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2008).
8 See Justin S. Teff, The Judges v. The State: Obtaining Adequate Judicial Compensation
and New York's Current Constitutional Crisis, 72 ALB. L. REV. 191, 193-94 (2009). Former
Governor Mario Cuomo and Chief Justice Sol Wachtler battled this same issue with equal
intensity in 1991. The Governor sued the Chief Judge in Federal Court and, though a settle-
ment was ultimately reached, the issue sparked years of contentious debate.
9 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
1o Id at 259.
" Id. (claiming that between one-third and one-quarter of the value of judges' salaries
have been lost since 1998).
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judges they stand before.12 It became apparent to both "the bench
and the bar" that intervention would soon be required. 13 As a result,
in 2006, the Judiciary submitted a budget to the Governor that in-
cluded over $69 million for judicial compensation adjustments.' 4
Moreover, there was no alteration to the budget submitted by the
Governor to the Legislature and support for the pay increase seemed
to be unanimous.' 5 A year later, the New York Senate passed two
bills which would raise state trial judges' salaries to a level equiva-
lent with those on the federal bench.16 The first of these two bills
(S5313), designed to eliminate the linkage of judicial salary adjust-
ments with legislative compensation through the use of an indepen-
dent commission, did not pass through the Assembly since its com-
panion bill in the Assembly (A7913) included campaign finance
reform measures.' 7 The Legislature's salary increase was also part of
that bill and, since the Governor declined to act on it, the judicial
compensation package remained frozen.18 Ironically, the ensuing Se-
nate bill (S6550), which did not mention Legislative pay commission,
passed by a wide margin in the Senate, though the Assembly refused
to act on it.19 Despite strong political opposition, the Governor ap-
propriated the necessary funds for the judges' pay increases, includ-
ing retroactive payments, in both the 2006-2007 and 2008-2009
budgets. 20 Thereafter, the Legislature failed to introduce measures to
allocate the appropriate funds and that inaction is the focal point of
this appeal. 21 The net effect of this process is that the Judiciary's pay
increases became part of a political power play in which the plaintiff-
judges were left without recourse, save for a suit for declarative and
injunctive relief.22
The plaintiffs' claim stated two causes of action. First, is the
12 Id. at 260.
13 Id.
14 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
15 Id. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1. The Governor added his assent to the compensation ad-
justment along with the budget.
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alleged violation of article VI, section 25(a) of the New York Consti-
tution, which states, in part, that any diminution of the compensation
of judges or justices is prohibited.23 The plaintiffs argued that while
salaries remained flat, the cost of living in New York sharply rose
and that dichotomy, in effect, resulted in a diminution in salary.24
The second claim centered around the issue of linkage whereby the
plaintiffs allege that the Legislature unlawfully hinged their own pay
increases on unrelated matters such as judicial compensation. 25 The
judges not only asked that the "impounded" $69.5 million be released
and that the annual increases disbursed, but also that there be perma-
nent enjoinment from the employment of linkage in the future.26
The Supreme Court, New York County, released the Gover-
nor from the case awarding him summary judgment and held that
judicial salaries had neither been diminished, nor had the Governor
violated any provision of the New York Constitution in question.27
However, the court did find that a sufficient claim was made with re-
gard to the issue of linkage and ruled that the Legislature's conduct
resulted in a violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine.28 The
Legislature agreed that the plaintiffs' increase was in order and
agreed, in principle, that linkage did contribute to the delay in such
relief, but argued that the issue is one to be decided inside the walls
of the Legislature and not inside a courtroom.29
On this point, the court found that a constitutional violation
indeed occurred and the issue is to be decided by the Judiciary. 30 The
defendants were ordered to remedy the constitutional violation within
ninety days of the decision "by proceeding in good faith to adjust
compensation payable to members of the Judiciary to reflect the in-
creased cost of living since the last salary adjustment in
1998/1999."31 On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department,
decided the case by analyzing the claim against the backdrop of three
23 Id. at 260-261; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 25(a).
24 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
25 id.
26 id.
27 Id. at 262. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 25(a). No direct diminution had occurred so,
therefore, no overall violation of the provision.
28 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
29 Id.
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concepts: the Compensation Clause, Legislative Immunity via the
Speech or Debate Clause, and, most importantly, the Separation of
Powers doctrine.32
First, in affirming the decision to dismiss the claim that there
was a violation of the Compensation Clause, the First Department
agreed with the Third Department's decision in Matter of Maron v.
Silver.33 This approach is contrasted by the plaintiffs' contention
whereby compensation is broadly interpreted and read in the context
of the times and the overall financial portrait of the period in which
the judges must live. 34  The Compensation Clause has been inter-
preted to mean that there is room for the Legislature to take a position
towards judicial salaries that might be adverse.3 s The United States
and New York constitutional views are identical in this regard; the
Legislature is granted power over judicial salary determinations.36
In the second cause of action, the defendants relied on the
New York State Constitution which states that, "[fjor any speech or
debate in either house of the Legislature, the members shall not be
questioned in any other place."37 The thrust of the defendants' argu-
ment in positing the Speech or Debate Clause was that the provision
removes legislative decision-making from judicial review since such
review would be mere conjecture and speculation about the intentions
of the Legislature. 38 Moreover, the defendants argued that their inac-
32 See generally Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d 256.
" Maron, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 409. The Compensation Clause challenge fails in this case be-
cause the salaries have not been diminished. In Maron, an identical dispute regarding judi-
cial salaries was at issue. The principle of the Compensation Clause, namely, that judicial
compensation shall not be diminished during the judge's time on the bench, was narrowly
construed by the court in that compensation was defined as actual, tangible salary and wage.
34 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
35 Maron, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 227 (1980)).
The Compensation Clause has been interpreted to mean that there is room for the Legislature
to take a position towards judicial salaries that might be adverse.
36 Maron, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 413-14. Such power is not absolute and policy choices must
be reviewed in light of the Separation of Powers doctrine. In New York, case law on the
subject leans squarely in favor of the defendants' approach. See Matter of Benvenega v.
LaGuardia, 63 N.E.2d 88 (N.Y. 1945). In the Supreme Court, the issue was more focused on
the premise that inflation was an "indirect, nondiscriminatory lowering of judicial compensa-
tion" and while there was consternation that the judiciary's power would become diluted as a
result, the outcome in these cases was still similar to the New York holdings; the effect of
inflation on judicial salaries is not enough to be a violation of the Compensation Clause. See
Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
37 N.Y. CONST. ART. III, § 11.
38 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
2010] 763
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tion is policy based and, therefore, free from the any judicial chal-
lenge.
The defendants assert that the plaintiffs' linkage analysis is a
manifestation of speculation; therefore, it is in violation of the clause
and any such review would be improper since the Legislature engag-
es in the making or denial of laws as a matter of course and to inquire
about the propriety of their activities would be to invite unwarranted
scrutiny.40 Historical insight into the development of the law bears
the defendants' assertions out especially in light of the law's interpre-
tation on the federal level.4 1 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
clause as a necessary protection for the Legislature both against inti-
midation from the executive branch and from criticism and scrutiny
from a "possibly hostile judiciary." 4 2  However, with regard to lin-
kage specifically, the defendants rely on the Supreme Court decision
in Bogan v. Scott-Harris.43 Since that case turned on resource alloca-
tion issues and budget management, which are claims not made here,
the appellate division looked to New York law to attempt to find
more clarity. In Pataki v. New York State Assembly, the New York
Court of Appeals held that the courts are empowered to rule on the
constitutional boundaries of the different branches of government
and, here, the court utilized that holding to find that legislative im-
munity was not available to the defendants for use as a shield against
Separation of Powers claims brought by the plaintiff judges." Since
39 Id.
40 Id.at 267.
41 See People v. Ohrenstein, 565 N.E.2d 493, 501 (N.Y.1990). The federal Speech or De-
bate provision was born out of the political conflicts of the "diverse governing bodies of the
American colonies" and traces back to this country's English roots. See also Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951).
42 See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1975); see al-
so Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972) (legislative interactions with the execu-
tive branch might further legislative interests, but would not generally be protected legisla-
tive activity).
43 See generally Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (showing due deference to the
Legislature by refusing to inquire into the motives behind its decision to eliminate an entire
department from a city budget, becasue such a decision is budgetary and, as such, legislative
in nature). The difference in this case is that the decision not to increase judicial salaries was
not budgetary at all but political; therefore, the deference shown to the Legislature in Bogan
was strictly based on an allocation of resource basis-a claim not made by the defendants in
this case.
4 824 N.E.2d 898, 910-11 (N.Y. 2004). It is important to note that the plaintiffs did not
name any legislators specifically so, therefore, the court in this case does not consider the
legislative immunity defense to be available since no one legislator is under attack. See La-
764 [Vol. 26
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judicial review is not barred by operation of the Legislative Immunity
via the Speech or Debate clause, the appellate division decided the
case on the defendant's claim that the Separation of Powers doctrine
is not implicated.45
The First Department's analysis of the Separation of Powers
claim represents the focal point of this decision and presents a signif-
icant departure from that of the Third Department.4 6 In affirming the
lower court's decision granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs,
the First Department confirmed that the Separation of Powers doc-
trine had been violated.47 In doing so, the court examined the action
of the Legislature and not necessarily its inaction. 48 In order to com-
pletely examine this issue, the doctrine must first be clearly identified
and then analyzed in light of both the New York and Federal regimes.
First, it is well established that three separate, co-equal
branches of government, intertwine to form our American system.49
Traditionally, the Legislature has been empowered to make decisions
on the issue of resource allocation.50 In addition,
[t]he necessity of preserving each from every form of
illegitimate intrusion or interference on the part of the
other is so imperative as to require this court, when its
judicial power is properly invoked, to view with a
careful and discriminating eye any legislation chal-
lenged as constituting such an intrusion or interfe-
rence.5
However, the Separation of Powers doctrine, as applied in this
case, is more sharply focused on the convergence of that power with
the issue of judicial compensation.52 Not surprisingly, throughout the
history of American government, judicial compensation, and disputes
rabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
45 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
4 Id. at 270.
47 id.
48 Id. at 271.
49 Matter of Kelch v. Town Bd. of Davenport, 829 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252 (App. Div. 3d.
Dep't. 2007).
5o Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 249 (1920).
51 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 611 (1937).
52 Larabee, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
2010] 765
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over governmental salaries in general, have been contentious.53 One
needs only to look at the language of the Judiciary Law and the New
York Constitution to understand that each branch's compensation
package was intended to be determined outside the purview of the
Legislature.5 4 The prevailing federal view is that the ongoing debate
in this realm leaves the Judiciary dependent and vulnerable to the
Legislature, which was a fear of at least one court during the time of
the ratification of the Constitution. In O'Donoghue v. United
States, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of compensation and
reiterated that separation is not "a matter of convenience" but is vital
to the maintenance of the American scheme.56 The Supreme Court
stressed the importance of Separation of Powers and especially noted
the "anxiety of the framers of the Constitution to preserve the inde-
pendence especially of the judicial department."5 7  American juri-
sprudence promptly recognized that matters of judicial compensation
are inextricably intertwined with judicial independence vis-a-vis the
legislative branch of government, requiring "a continuing guaranty of
an independent judicial administration for the benefit of the whole
people."5 8 Thereafter, the Supreme Court identified the Judiciary as
the "weakest" of the three branches in Evans v. Gore.59 In Evans, the
plaintiff-judge challenged the validity of a tax and won based on the
impingement of the Judiciary by the Legislature. 60 This case was lat-
er overruled by the decision in United States v. Hatter; however, the
primary holding in the decision still underscores the fear with which
the Legislature's power over the Judiciary was historically viewed.61
In Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, the Virginia
5 See generally Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. 135 (1788).
54 Judiciary Law § 39 (sets forth that judicial compensation is to be increased by appropri-
ation); N.Y. CONST. art IV § 3 (Governor's salary to be fixed by the Senate and Assembly's
joint resolution). Each branches' salary determinations are specified outside art III, which
signals a directive that the Legislature is not to subordinate any of the other branches in this
regard.
5 See Cases ofthe Judges ofthe Court ofAppeals, 8 Va. 135.
56 O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933).
" Id. at 531.
58 Id. at 533.
5 Evans, 253 U.S. at 249.
6 Id. at 245.
61 See United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 560-61 (2001). Linkage, as employed in
these circumstances, manifested an abandonment of any pretense to an objective considera-
tion ofjudicial compensation unimpeded by extraneous political considerations.
766 [Vol. 26
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Court of Appeals noted that the Judiciary must be protected from
"dependence upon the Legislature" if its role in protecting the people
from the government's actions was going to be effectively main-
tained.62 The justices specifically addressed matters of compensation
in "respectful remonstrance" to the Virginia Assembly and stressed
the importance of "independent judicial administration for the benefit
of the whole people." 63 This holding foreshadowed the events taking
place in Larabee and similar judicial compensation cases. Recently,
the Supreme Court noted the importance of judicial compensation
beyond the individual justices' monetary interests and adopted a
broader approach; that adequate compensation is an effective means
of attracting and retaining the most qualified battery of judges availa-
ble.64 In another albeit factually unrelated compensation case, the
Court redefined the Separation of Powers doctrine by positioning it as
a prophylactic device; one designed to be a general safety as opposed
to a specific remedy against distinct claims.65 Herein lies the main
feature of the federal approach on the subject which establishes "high
walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions
will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict." 66
The Federal position on this issue directs clear protections of the Ju-
diciary, and other co-existing branches of government, from en-
croachments by any overbearing branches. The decision in Larabee
is novel in its contrast to recent cases in New York, with regard to
Separation of Powers violations.
The New York law on this issue reinforced the notion of sepa-
rate and autonomous branches of government.67 The volume of case
law is sparse with regard to this issue, generally, and with regard to
judicial compensation, the case law is even less populated.68 The on-
ly Court of Appeals case, decided in 1898, on the issue held, "[a]ny
legislation that hampers judicial action, or interferes with the dis-
charge of judicial functions, is in conflict with the principles of the
constitution." 69 New York law utilizes the doctrine more directly and
62 Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. 135.
63 id
64 See Evans, 253 U.S. at 253.
65 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995).
66 Id.
67 People ex rel. Burby v. Howland, 49 N.E. 775, 779 (N.Y.1898).
68 See Teff, supra note 8 at 220-21.
69 Burby, 49 N.E. at 779. The Legislature in this case, which was decided in 1898, re-
2010] 767
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actually states that the point of the law is to prevent any one branch
of government from seeking maximization of its powers. 70 The con-
cept was further strengthened in a New York Court of Appeals case
in 1985, which, among other concepts, holds that the doctrine of Se-
paration of Powers in New York "inheres, by implication in the pat-
tern of government adopted by the State." 7' In Under 21 Catholic
Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City of New York, the court
held that the Mayor of New York could not dictate the hiring policies
of those who secured contracts with the city.72 "While the doctrine of
Separation of Powers does not require maintenance of three airtight
departments of government, it does require that no one branch be al-
lowed to arrogate unto itself powers residing entirely in another
branch."73 This holding stands for the application of the doctrine to
inter-branch governmental disputes, which is the issue in the instant
case and, if the language of the statute is followed, was decided cor-
rectly.74
"The judicial system is at its best when it stands above and
apart from the political interactions that more typically characterize
the other two forms of government."75 Since the Judiciary is depen-
dent upon the other two branches in regard to matters of compensa-
tion a delicate balancing act is required. "[I]t is not the province of
the courts to direct the legislature how to do its work" just as the
same might be said of the legislature as it would be inappropriate for
it to act to the detriment of the Judiciary and impose impediments to
the functioning of the Judiciary unabated.76 With such clarity in the
law, however, Larabee represents a stark detour from the path carved
out by the Third Department's recent decision in Maron.77
In Maron v. Silver, both current and former judges brought an
moved some duties from justices of the peace and, as a result, lowered their compensation
accordingly. Id.
70 Cohen v. State of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 1, 13-14 (1999) (holding that law requiring
legislators pay is to be upheld if no budget is passed by the first day of a fiscal year since it
was not in violation of the separation of powers doctrine).
71 Under 21 Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City of New York, 482
N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y.1985).
72 Idat8.
" Id at 4.
74 Id. at 10.
75 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
76 Urban Justice Ctr. v. Pataki, 828 N.Y.S.2d 12, 27 (App. Div. 1st. Dep't 2006).
7 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
768 [Vol. 26
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Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of mandamus to order New
York's Comptroller to disburse appropriated funds set aside for
judges and to compel the states' other branches of government to
keep judicial salaries in line with inflation. In addition, the suit
claimed an action of declaratory relief against the legislature and the
governor due to failures of each to increase judicial salaries, the same
claim as in this case. 79 The decision in Maron holds that the Separa-
tion of Powers claim is barred since the judges have not stated a
claim for relief, or put another way, the judges lacked standing.
The opinion cites to a case in which appointed defense counsel
brought an action for pay increases and, in which, the court held that
Separation of Powers principles dictate that judicial intervention may
be warranted "when legislative appropriations prove insufficient and
legislative inaction obstructs the Judiciary's ability to function," or
there is an imminent threat that such functioning will be impaired.
The Maron court relied on the decision in Matter of Kelch v.
Davenport and found that a claim in this realm can only be supported
by a showing that the Legislature had acted in a way that was both in
violation of the constitution and acted in a manner "likely to affect or
impinge upon the independence of the judiciary." 82 In Kelch, Britt
Kelch was recently elected as one of two town justices but the Legis-
lature set his salary at just $500 per year while it approved a raise for
the incumbent town justice from $5000 to $7500 annually.83 Kelch
argued that while the legislature is within its power to set salaries for
municipal employees, its actions violated both the Federal and New
84York Constitutions. The court ordered the Legislature to set
Kelch's salary appropriately.85 More importantly, the language used
set the tone for decisions thereafter by stating, "[a] real threat strikes
at the heart of judicial independence if the Judiciary must cater to the
ideological whims of the legislature or personally suffer the financial
78 See Maron, 871 N.Y.S. 406.
7 Id In Maron, there was an Equal Protection violation claimed, which changed the
complexity of the case in a way not discussed in Larabee. See id.
80 Id. at 416-17.
81 New York County Lawyers Assn. v. New York, 745 N.Y.S.2d 376, 436 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 2002).
82 Kelch, 829 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
83 Id. at 251.
84 Id. at 251.
85 Id. at 253.
2010] 769
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consequences for rendering legally correct but unpopular deci-
sions."16 The decision went on to cite Atkins v. United States and
found that the judges had "to demonstrate the existence of a plan fa-
shioned by the political branches, or at least of gross neglect on their
part, ineluctably operating to punish the judges qua judges, or to
drive them from office."87 Finally, the Third Department found that
since the Legislature had not seen a pay increase while it held the
judge's pay increase in abeyance, then there was no plan to restrict
the judges' salaries exclusively, nor was there a plan to control or
limit the power of the Judiciary.
The two departments differ on the concept that a present im-
pairment be a prerequisite to a claim for a violation of the Separation
of Powers doctrine. The underpinning of the argument is that the Ju-
diciary has no present loss and, therefore, a present Separation of
Powers claim is unripe. Maron stands for the theory that a present,
specific complaint is necessary. The Larabee court disagreed and
held that the attempted erosion of the barriers, which insulate one
branch from another, was enough to find a violation of the doctrine
without any further specification required. 89 While a specific and
present impairment is sufficient for a claim to be viable, it is not es-
sential.90 Justice Tom went on to state that the Legislature's inclu-
sion of judicial compensation in the world of politics to this degree
was a clear violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine. 91 "A line
has been crossed in contravention of the warnings long articulated in
what has become a deeply rooted constitutional jurisprudence. The
basic tenet of the Separation of Powers doctrine, to promote and
maintain the independence and stability of each branch of govern-
ment, has been violated." 92 Furthermore, the court endorsed the no-
tion of an independent commission to review, analyze, and then re-
port to the Legislature on their recommendations regarding the
issue.93 The court has endorsed this methodology on other occasions
6 Id. at 252.
8 Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1054 (1977).
88 See generally Maron, 871 N.Y.S. 404.
89 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
90 Id
91 Id.
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as well, including matters relating to education. 94
The approach utilized by the First Department is sensible, logi-
cal, and fair. It is well-known that New York courts, especially those
in the five boroughs and their surrounding areas, are some of the bu-
siest in the country.95 Despite this fact, New York judges do not even
rank in the top 10 in the nation when their salaries are considered in
absolute terms.96 The numbers are even worse when the level of
compensation is measured against the actual cost of living especially
in light of the fact that the cost of living in New York is among the
highest in the nation.97 The proposed plan of action in Larabee,
which could empower an independent commission to make a deter-
mination regarding judicial compensation, works to ensure that the
branches of government remain appropriately separate while each
maintains an effective working relationship with the others. As a re-
sult, one might argue that the arbiters of judicial compensation are, in
fact, the judges themselves.
While the outcome of such an issue seems well in hand when
decided by the would-be-beneficiaries, judges are tasked with and are
empowered to decide numerous issues where their impartiality is es-
sential and where their decisions, potentially, can directly impact
them both to their benefit and detriment. Although the outcome is
not frequently a gain or loss to their personal paychecks, the issues in
front of them are rarely, if ever, inconsequential to their functions as
judges. Moreover, judges are entrusted to be fair, equitable, and in-
herently detached; all of which are absolute keys to our judicial sys-
tem. The fact that they would approve the first compensation in-
crease for themselves after more than a decade's wait would not be
seen by most reasonable voters and citizens to be an abuse of power.
In addition, the presentation of an independent commission to review
and report on the issue is similarly fair and reasonable and represents
a safeguard against any semblance of impropriety. The Legislature
could argue that they their power in controlling salaries within muni-
cipalities is being usurped by such a commission. However, the re-
94 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 20 (2006) (Independent
assessment made regarding the allocation of overall budgets for state run schools).
9 Larabee II, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
96 id.
97 Id. New York judges' salaries rank 48th in the nation when viewed against the cost of
living in New York. Id.
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porting would go to the Legislature before being decided on so it
would still have adequate control over the issue.
The New York courts' position on this issue is in line with the
precedents set by both the New York and the United States Constitu-
tions. In addition, judicial pay increases is one issue that is agreed on
by all branches of the government. One that should be an easier push
through the system than it is proving to be. Ultimately, the Legisla-
ture's inaction resulted in the inference that by using the Judiciary's
salary increases, already assented to by the Governor, as leverage to
resist campaign finance reform. Such an inference is a rather unfor-
tunate outcome and an undesirable result for those seeking to shed
the public's image of a recalcitrant, unfocused, and self-serving rep-
resentative body; an image which continues to perpetually plague our
system.
Lastly, it is important to note Judge Lehner's imposition of a
90-day deadline before which the compensation must be appropriated
which is above and beyond the amended remedy sought by the plain-
tiffs.98 The appellate division's decision on this case will surely lead
to more intriguing subsequent results and, possibly, even more litiga-
tion. While this decision could present a welcomed shift in the direc-
tion of the judges, a shift that would receive little to no argument
from either side, the concept upon which it seems to turn, that more
than a present showing of a contentious relationship must fortify a
claim for a violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine, is contro-
versial. Perhaps now that the First Department has recognized the
long-term ramifications of the dispute, the New York Court of Ap-
peals will now have the necessary support to award the judges the
upgrade all agree is overdue.
Daniel G. De Pasquale
98 Id at 262.
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